James G. Clawson and Joan M. Clawson; Tex R. oldsen and Monna Lee Olsen; and Ken Chamberlain and Jeannine W. Chamberlain v. Bruce L. Moesser and Ruth Anne Moesser : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
James G. Clawson and Joan M. Clawson; Tex R.
oldsen and Monna Lee Olsen; and Ken
Chamberlain and Jeannine W. Chamberlain v.
Bruce L. Moesser and Ruth Anne Moesser :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kay M. Lewis; Jensen and Lewis; Attorneys for Defendants.
Ken Chamberlain; Olsen and Chamberlain; Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation




DEC 9 19, 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Reuben Clark Law Stlicol 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES G. CLAWSON and JOAN M. 
CLAWSON, his wife, TEX R. OLSEN 
and MONNA LEE OLSEN, his wife; 
and KEN CHAMBERLAIN and JEAN-
NINE W. CHAMBERLAIN, his.wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
•vs-
BRUCE L. MOESSER and RUTH ANNE 
MOESSER, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE NO. 
13653 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Ee'spondents 
KAY M. LEWIS 
JENSEN & LEWIS 
320 South 300 East 
Suite #1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




Clerk, Supremo JSovfc Wah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PETITION FOR REHEARING .'...' 1 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING: 
POINT I THE MAJORITY OPINION WITHOUT BEING 
REVISED, WILL INADVERTENTLY REPEAL A 
RULE OF LONG STANDING IN THIS STATE: 
THAT UNDER A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE OR 
EXECUTION SALE, TITLE AND THE RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION, USE, AND BENEFIT OF THE 
PROPERTY WILL NOT PASS UNTIL THE SHER-
IFF' S DEED IS EXECUTED 1 
POINT II REDEMPTION BY ONE WHO HAS PARTED WITH 
TITLE SUSTAINS TITLE WHERE IT IS THEN 
VESTED - NOT BACK TO THE MORTGAGOR 
WHO HAS CONVEYED 7 
POINT III THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRS IN ITS HOLDING 
THAT SPAULDING RETAINED SOME TYPE OF 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 11 
CONCLUSION 15 
CASES CITED 
Barry vs. Harnesberger (CCA 7TH) 148 F. 346 7 
Carlquist vs. Colthorp, 67 Utah 514, 248 P 481 (1926) 5 
Chataque County Bank vs. Risley, 19 N.Y. 373 (1859) . 9 
First National Bank of Salt Lake City vs. Hammond, 
89 Utah 151, 59 P2d 1401 7 
Harvey vs. Spaulding, 16 Iowa 397, 85 Am.Dec.526 (1864) 7, 8 
Layton vs. Layton, 105 Utah 1, 140 P2d 759 (1943) . . 15, 16 
Local Realty vs. Lindquist, 96 Utah 293, 85 P2d 770(1938) 1-5, 
13-16 
Ulrich vs. Lincoln Realty, 197 P2d 149, 180 Ore 380. . 7 
Yoakum vs. Bower, 51 Cal. 539 (1876) 8, 12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Page 
47 ALR 1st at 765 5 
55 Am.Jur2d> Mortgages, § 901, at 781 6 
59 CJS, Mortgages, § 875(e) at 1705 6 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-2 7 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure § 69(e)(5) 10 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure § 69(e)(6) . . . . . . 3, 11 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure § 69(f)(1) 7, 16 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES G. CLAWSON and JOAN M. 
CLAWSON, his wife; TEX R. OLSEN 
and MONNA LEE OLSEN, his wife; 
and KEN CHAMBERLAIN and JEANNINE 
W. CHAMBERLAIN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs-
BRUCE L. MOESSER and RUTH ANNE 
MOESSER, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION 
Come now the Respondents, James G. Clawson and Joan M. Claw-
son, his wife; Tex R. Olsen and Monna Lee Olsen, his wife; and 
Ken Chamberlain and Jeannine W. Chamberlain, his wife, and peti-
tion the Court for a rehearing in the captioned case upon the 
following grounds and for the following reasons: 
1. The majority opinion of May 2, 1975 has, without treating 
the subject, inadvertently overruled a long standing principle 
of real property of this state, to-wit: the landowner's title 
and right to possession, use, and benefit of property sold on 
mortgage foreclosure or execution sale is reserved to him dur-
ing the redemption period and until the sheriff's deed. 
Local Realty vs. Linquist, 96 Utah 293, 85 P2d 770 (1938) 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
NO. 13653 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. The majority opinion has decided the case on an issue 
and a theory not raised in the lower court or considered in 
any brief or oral argument; therefore, Respondents have never 
had the opportunity or occasion to present the rule of law 
reflected in this Petition and Brief which rule, the under-
signed submits, has been well settled and of long standing. 
3. The majority opinion has incorrectly applied those cases 
from other jurisdictions upon which its result is based. 
4. In addition to reversing, unintentionally, the rule res-
pecting right to possession during the redemption period, the 
majority opinion, if unmodified, will establish an undesirable 
and conflicting legal precedent, to-wit: 
An owner of land may mortgage his property to one person 
and convey to another, then default on his mortgage, allow a 
sale, and thereafter redeem from that sale and thereby defeat 
the title of his own grantee. 
Such a defaulting mortgagor could avoid legal obligations 
of a like kind to the injury of holders of lawful claims by 
execution, inferior judgments, voluntarily and involuntarily 
created liens, and similar interests in the title. 
Cases cited in the annexed Brief have, by express holdings, 
appropriately prohibited that result. 
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WHEREFORE, Respondents respectfully request a rehearing 
and the opportunity to present those cases and treat those 
issues raised for the first time by the theory upon which 
the majority opinion is based. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ken Chamberlain 
01sen and Chamberlain 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES G. CLAWSON and JOAN M. 
CLAWSON, his wife; TEX R. OLSEN 
and MONNA LEE OLSEN, his wife; 
and KEN CHAMBERLAIN and JEAN-
NINE W. CHAMBERLAIN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs-
BRUCE L. MOESSER and RUTH ANNE 
MOESSER, husband and wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
NO. 13653 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
P O I N T I 
THE MAJORITY OPINION, WITHOUT BEING REVISED, 
WILL INADVERTENTLY REPEAL A RULE OF LONG 
STANDING IN THIS STATE: THAT UNDER A MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE OR EXECUTION SALE, TITLE AND THE 
RIGHT TO POSSESSION, USE AND BENEFIT OF THE 
PROPERTY WILL NOT PASS UNTIL THE SHERIFF'S 
DEED IS EXECUTED l 
Both Mr. Justice Ellett for the majority and Mr. Justice 
Crockett in his dissent have correctly resolved and applied 
four of the rules fundamental to mortgage foreclosure and 
execution sales. Without arguing them we restate them herewith: 
(1) Sale thereunder entirely exhausts the lien of a mort-
gage; (2) Any deficiency judgment attaches only after the sale 
proceeds have been credited against the amount due; (3) The 
Local Realty vs. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297. 85 P2d 770 (1938) 
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lien can attach only to the property in the name of the mort-
gagor (judgment debtor) as of the date of the deficiency judg-
ment achieves the dignity of a lien;and (4) The judgment 
debtor has the absolute right, by statute, to redeem. 
But in order to reach the further result - amounting to 
the disposition of this case - that SpauldingTs redemption 
took title back to himself, the majority opinion makes this 
ruling, although incorrect, which is essential to the ultimate 
holding: 
* * * When Spaulding redeemed * * * he gave no 
vitality to Clawsons' defunct claim. 
If Clawsons1 claim (which was the legal title to the land) 
were defunct at the time of SpauldingTs redemption we could 
not dispute the Justices1 statement. But to characterize Claw-
sons' claim as defunct would unintentionally obliterate a 
fundamental right which has been established for many years 
in this state: The right to possession, use, and the rents 
and profits of the mortgaged estate during the period of redemp-
tion. 
The case of Local Realty vs. Lindquist3 96 Utah 2973 85 P2d 
770 (1938) is a landmark decision in which the present Chief 
Justice was prevailing counsel. 
The issue in that case was the entitlement to the value of 
use and possession of the mortgaged premises during the redemp-
tion period. The Lindquist case holds: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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* * * title does not pass to the purchaser until 
execution and delivery of the [sheriff's] deed 
and such is the recognized rule now in practi-
cally all states. If the legal title had already 
passed there would be no necessity for a convey-
ance [85 P2d at 773] 
This holding is not dicta but is essential to the result, 
otherwise, how could the mortgagor have been awarded the 
usufruct of the land during the redemption period. 
Going back one step in the chain of title to this property, 
the redemption period incident to the sale at which Clawson 
purchased Spauldingfs interest had expired and Clawson 
obtained his sheriff's deed on October 16, 1969, many months 
before Spaulding redeemed. 
Under Rule 69(e)(6) Clawson took all right, title, interest, 
and claim which Spaulding had in the property. 
The cases cited in the majority opinion correctly hold 
that a mortgagor has a right to redeem but not because he has 
a claim in or title to the land or in fact any interest in 
the land but because the statute says he has that right. All 
those cases reflect situations where the mortgagor or debtor 
had parted with all his title; otherwise th^rwouM never have 
arisen or needed deciding. Also, those cases say there may 
be a variety of reasons why a mortgagor or debtor should be 
able to redeem. 
But none of those cases says that the redemption takes 
title back to the mortgagor or debtor. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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It now becomes important to see what the Utah cases say 
about the question. In order to reach the result in Local 
Realty vs. Lindquist the Court said: 
[85 P2d at 772] A redemption is not a re-sale 
or a re-purchase. 
* * * xt is generally consummated without the know-
ledge of the purchaser at the time, and without 
his consent and perhaps often as against his will. 
The money is generally paid to the sheriff who 
voids or annuls as it were the sale and cancels 
the certificate. 
* * * 
In a very general way and speaking loosely, the 
interest of the purchaser on execution sale and dur-
ing the redemption period may be called a lien, as it 
signifies an interest in the property which may be 
cancelled, lost or voided upon payment of a certain 
sum of money. * * * The purchaser has bought the land 
from the sheriff and paid for it, upon a sale, which 
may be voided or in effect rejected by the debtor by 
the simple expedient of him repaying to the purchaser 
the amount paid with interest within a limited time. 
* * * 
In such sale the purchaser is not subrogated to and 
does not acquire all the right, title, estate, 
interest or claim of the judgment debtor until the 
expiration of the redemption period. 
The holding of the Lindquist case to the effect that the judg 
ment debtor is, in contemplation of law, the owner of property 
sold under execution during the redemption period and has the 
right to its use and occupation was not given consideration 
in the majority opinion when it characterizes Clawson1s claim 
as defunct by the statement: 
[Redemption] gave no vitality to Clawson1s defunct 
claim. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
The holding that a redemption is not a re-sale or a 
re-purchase is likewise essential to the holding that the 
use, possession, and entitlement to benefits of the land 
during the redemption do not pass to the purchaser until 
the sheriff's deed because if tte redemption did start a new 
title the necessary implication would be that the holder of 
the certificate of sale had the title and the benefits that 
flow from it all the time. The Lindquist case says as much 
at 85 P2d p. 773: 
* * * if the legal title had already passed, 
there would be no necessity for a conveyance 
(citing cases). 
And Local Realty vs. Lindquist is not a case lightly 
regarded. It drew upon Carlquist vs. Colthovp > 67 Utah 514
 5 
248 P 481 (1926) which became the subject of an annotation in 
47 ALR 1st Series (p. 765) for the proposition that even the 
appointment of a receiver does not transfer the benefits of 
possession during the redemption period to the execution sale 
purchaser. 
Local Realty vs. Lindquist was cited in this Court's 
unanimous decision by then District Judge Ellett in Lay ton vs. 
Layton, 105 Utah l3 140 P2d 759 (1943) for its holding that: 
In a very general way and speaking loosely, 
the interest of a purchaser on execution sale 
and during redemption period may be called a 
lien as it signifies an interest in the property 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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which may be cancelled, lost, or voided upon pay-
ment of a certain sum of money * * * It is a right 
which may be defeated by payment of such sum. The 
purchaser has bought the land from the sheriff and 
paid for it, upon a sale, which may be voided or 
in effect rejected by the debtor by the simple 
expedient of him repaying to the purchaser the 
amount paid with interest within a limited time. 
That a redemption is not a re-sale or re-purchase (85 P2d at 
7 72) is galvanized by the unqualified statement in Volume 55 
Am.Jur2d, p.781, Mortgages,§ 901. 
Effect of Redemption: 
* * * it [redemption] does not give to the mort-
gagor a new title, however, but merely restores 
to him the title freed of the encumbrance of the 
lien foreclosed [Emphasis added] 
In Volume 59, CJS, p.1705, Mortgages, § 875(e) the universal 
rule is stated: 
-k * * redemption by the mortgagor or his grantee 
does not give him a new title, but merely restores 
him to his former title of ownership of the pro-
perty free of the encumbrance. 
The majority opinion, in the face of that universally-accepted 
rule, has given Spaulding an entirely new title because he 
(Spaulding) parted with all right, title, interest, and claim 
to the property on October 16, 1969 under a valid sheriff's 
deed and almost nine months before he redeemed from the second 
sale. To give Spaulding anything on that second redemption is 
to create an entirely new, separate and distinct title unrelated 
to the old one. 
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P O I N T II 
REDEMPTION BY ONE WHO HAS PARTED WITH TITLE 
SUSTAINS TITLE WHERE IT IS THEN VESTED - NOT 
BACK TO THE MORTGAGOR WHO HAS CONVEYED 
The majority opinion is correct in that (1) A sale there-
under exhausts the lien of a mortgage; (2) A deficiency judg-
ment attaches only after the sale proceeds have been credited 
2 
against the amount due; and (3) The lien can attach only to 
property in the name of the mortgagor (judgment debtor) as of 
the date the deficiency judgment achieves the dignity and effect 
of a lien^ and (4) that the judgment debtor (mortgagor) had 
the absolute right to redeem. 
Although, however, the three cases cited in the majority 
opinion do clearly hold, as that opinion recites, that a mort-
gagor having parted with his title may nevertheless redeem, 
those cases do not hold that such redemption gives the title 
back to the mortgagor who has conveyed. 
Most notable is the Iowa case of Harvey vs. Spaulding3 
16 Iowa 3973 85 Am.Dec. 526 (1864) which was an action or a 
proceeding where the foreclosing mortgagor and Plaintiff ad-
vanced the contention that a judgment debtor had no right to 
redeem from the sheriff's sale because he had, before the sale, 
2
 7 8-37-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. First National Bank of Salt 
Lake City vs. Hammond, 89 Utah 151, 59 P2d 1401. 
3 
Ulrich vs. Lincoln Realty Co., 197 P2d 149, 180 Ore 380; Barry vs, 
Harnesberger (CCA 7th) 148 F.346. 
4
 Rule 69(f)(1) U.R.C.P. 
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parted with all of his interest in the land and that at the 
time he sought to redeem he had no interest whatever in the 
real estate. The Supreme Court of Iowa stated: 
The question gives us no trouble. The statute 
expressly provides that the judgment debtor may 
redeem. 
The effect of Harvey vs. Spaulding was to validate the 
mortgagor's redemption and to establish title in the redeeming 
mortgagor's grantee. 
Likewise in Yoakum vs. Bower3 51 Cat. 539 (1876) the facts 
are almost exactly identical to those here. Margaret J. Bur-
dete sold property subject to a pending action in December 
1874. In April 1875 the Plaintiff in that action recovered a 
judgment and an order of execution which was delivered to the 
sheriff (Bower) and Defendant in the action. Even though she 
had sold the property Burdete redeemed the Hirschfield sale 
in November of 1975. Hirschfield in December 1875 assigned 
his certificate of sale to the Plaintiff. 
The California Supreme Court did not even speculate upon 
the reasons why Mrs. Burdete may have redeemed. They only 
said: 
The successor in interest may redeem, but the judg-
ment debtor may also do so. The statute provides 
that the judgment debtor, as such, may redeem * * * 
There is no good reason why the statute, which is 
remedial in its character, should receive a narrow 
construction, in order to defeat the right of 
redemption which it intended to give. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Thi; Court". !..••; not interested in the reasons why the judg-
ment debtor did redeem buL only states: 
It might be that the judgment debtor has cove-
nanted with his successor In interest to effect 
redemption from the sale, and a variety of other 
cases might readily be imagined in which the judg-
ment debtor even though he had sold the property 
and would still have an interest in effecting a 
redemption from the execution sale. 
The third case relied upon by the majority opinion, Chataque 
Couniy Bank vc . Ris Ie?/3 19 iV. Y. 3 7 '6 (18 59) ho 1 ds that another 
c r e d i t:c> r, "l| * '11< > » ; i s 11 i "> I >'i ]'" a r I: y t: o l h e u n d e r l y i n g i n d e b t e d u e s s , 
could sell the same real estate upon his own execution and the 
j'j-anl ee in the sheriff's deed acquired a title superior t:o that 
t) f 111 e i. n d I v 1 d u a I w h o c o n. t e n. d e d 11 "i i1 r c d e in p t: I o n w a s I n e f f e c t i v u , 
In the Chataque case there was no sliowing of any entitlement of 
Liu rudcii, - ,- - - land -v-d :-•'* -v^vipr win* he h;u 
reason t » redeem. L\U> \ , 'J:<Ui JJ I - ;-,
 : •" •* 
relating t^ '• h^ ripht of a deb1 or to Redeem: 
Trie right Is secured U. :*iir> ^ f- the judgment debtor 
by the terms of the statute, notwithstanding he may 
have parted with all his interest in the land by a 
prior fraudulent or subsequent honest conveyance. 
The Chataque County Bank cus.- h i : ; u LM<it tni:* i : v I redomp-
iliHi u/a« e x e r c i s e d t o j\iv<s ' ' * : i d i w i w i la i ; : ;o of i n d i v i d u a l s 
coming i n t o e x i s t e n c e p r i o i t • ; • -.•;•.. 
These t h r e e c a s e s do no t , u-d :•.. ^ a s e we h i v e been a b l e t o 
(iimi t h r o u g h i.'xhuiim i \ o -md th^roue.h r e s e a r c h f ^ s necn found t o 
h o l d t.h.'il. a m o r t g a g o r (o r e x e c u t i o n d e b t m ) who hrn: p / j r red vni i h 
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his tit l.c, even though, lie has the right to redeem, takes 
title back into his own n.a.';ie as against h'i i? Ijwful sucoessni: 
nteres!. 
1 . *, !_: i|-' t.-..' f !. " > ]. ;\ 'son was <re ;i-rf^4 s1 : ; 
c e s s e r i :i .i^U-i. / . - i \yt\* . . ' i " \ , I : : M ' . \ S ' . • * , •.. 
<-: Spaulding * i ' i ; . , u h i o ^ t p r o p e r ! y . The redemption oici n, f 
i ; H ~ < * . ' . t \ T * " * ' f * " - : V ' J t lit; 
purchaser .L ^-u-tq;age i o r i c i o s u r e s.^U: dt:J t hen < redempt ion 
* irs ^ : ~ *-\ v<r;i w\ l\ ' «n> f!l a^'son who h e l d a i l i n c i d e n t s 
o f 11 t: 1 e wl I i eh S p a u 1 ci i n g c o u 1 ci e ve i a s s e r I:. 
5 
Rule 6 (V )((V\ , S K . C . P . 
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"n r\ T iv p 
THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRS IN ITS HOLDING THAT 
SPAULDING RETAINED.SOME TYPE OF INTER EST IN 
THE PROPERTY 
The majority opinion, 1 n the 7th paragraph of Page 2, seems 
t o zre a t e some re s i dua1 p rop e rty in t e r e st in g ran t or s if the y 
have mortgaged the property before 1 lai i< i si mp] y becai ise they 
retained the bare statutory ri glut to redeem. The statement says: 
There can be no difference in tl le I nterest of one 
who loses his land to a judgment creditor on exe-
cution and one who voluntarily parts with his 
title by deed. It is certainly true that judg-
ment debtors without title to the land sole on 
execution have an equitable interest in the land 
in that they are entitled to have the land sold 
and the proceeds thereof applied to reduce their 
indebtedness. 
W respect, f 11 I ! y *" ij. (the C O U U D attention, to iu~le ijve)(6) 
whicl 1 states. 
Real Property, Upon the sale of real property the 
officer shall give to the purchaser a certificate 
of sale containing: (1) a particular description of 
of the real property sold; (2) the price paid by 
him for each lot or parcel if sold separately; 
(3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to the 
effect that all right, title, Interest and claim 
of the judgment Hettor in and to the property "is 
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where 
such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall 
be stated also. * * * [Emphasis added] 
On April ID, 1969 Clawson obtained a Certificate of Sale 
: ': ci,si.ily giving, In m "lli.'il. Rule 69(e)(6) says: 
All right, title, interest and claim of Lliu judgment 
deb t or (Sp an1ding). 
On October 16, 1.969, a sheriff's deed was Issued to Clawsott 
the maiordty opinion recites and about, which there can be 
n<» dispute . That- cut o ET every r:i }\\\ t wh i eh Spaul d i.ng h;is In Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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We respectfully submit that statutory language cannot be 
more inclusive or comprehensive, when dealing with the inci-
dents, interests, or property in or title to the real estate, 
than by enumerating "all right, title, interest and claim" to 
that property. 
The cases cited by the majority opinion hold that the 
mortgagor (debtor) may have some reasons why he is entitled 
to redeem. One of those reasons expressed in the majority 
opinion's citation to Yoakum vs. Bower on p. 540 (f 51 Cat is: 
* * * It might be that the judgment debtor has 
covenanted with his successor in interest to 
effect a redemption from the sale, and a variety 
of other cases might readily be imagined, in 
which the judgment debtor, even though he had 
sold theproperty, would still have an interest 
in effecting a redemption from the execution sale. 
It is notable that one of those reasons is not the ability 
to reclaim title. 
The majority opinion would discriminate between those cases 
where the mortgage or judgment debtor had conveyed by warranty 
deed and those cases where he had not. Would the Court give an 
individual who had received a quitclaim deed from the judgment 
debtor a "conditional11 title that could be defeated by his 
grantor redeeming whereas the recipient of a warranty deed 
would not be so limited? Furthermore, how would equity justify 
a discrimination between those situations where a redeeming 
former owner had voluntarily parted with his title (by warranty 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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deed or quitclaim deed, assignment or other transfer of 
interests) and where he had involuntarily been required to 
part with his title because of a lawful, legitimate, honest 
debt which he owed, and by levy upon his property to satisfy 
it? 
Going back to Local Realty vs. Lindquist3 a redemption is 
not a re-sale or a re-purchase. It only voids or annuls the 
sale and cancels the certificate. 
This is precisely what happened when Spaulding redeemed. 
He did not re-purchase the property and certainly McArthur 
did not re-sell it to him (85 P2d at 772). His redemption 
voided and annulled the sale and cancelled the certificate 
(85 P2d 773). This left title unencumbered in Clawson. 
The Court is faced with the reality of Clawsonfs title ob-
tained at a valid unredeemed sale and a consequent sheriff's 
deed. If that title is taken away from Clawson that divesti-
ture must be accomplished by the expedient of regarding Claw-
son's title as extinguished by the Certificate of Sale to 
McArthur when Walker Bank sold under its mortgage foreclosure. 
The Court cannot conclude that Clawson1s title was extinguished 
by any sheriff's deed because there was none. 
If that pretext - extinction of title upon issuance of a 
Certificate of Sale - is adopted as a judicial rule of mort-
gage foreclosures and execution sales, then there can be no way 
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to support the right of possession to execution-sold pre-
mises during the redemption period in any one other than the 
holder of the Certificate of Sale - a result diametrically 
contrary in reasoning and result to Local Realty vs. Lind-
quist, 96 Utah 2933 85 P2d 770 (1938). 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Crockett sheds 
great light on this circumstance where it states: 
When Spaulding redeemed, the result was to remove 
the Walker Bank mortgage and the judgment of fore-
closure, that had been entered against the pro-
perty * * * 
There are sound reasons why the foreclosure or mort-
gage should exhaust the interest the mortgagee can 
claim in the pledged property by reason cf the mort-
gage. In the first place, the mortgagee has obtained 
all the contract calls for with respect to that pro-
perty * * * when he has received that value * * * 
that is all he is entitled to from the security. The 
difficulty with the opposite result is that it allows 
the mortgagee to have3 in effect two mortgages on the -property. 
* * * 
I cannot see how the effect of that redemption and 
wiping out of the mortgage and judgment can properly 
be regarded as having the effect either of initiating 
a new title in Spaulding or quieting title in him by 
removing other prior and valid claims, i.e: the Claw-
son s. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The majority opinion adopts principles which are sound 
but, we submit in all respect to the author and those concur-
ring, has moved from those underlying principles to a non 
sequitur, by erecting a fictional title bridge which does 
not exist but which has been expressly rejected in the law. 
The majority opinion concedes that before the Walker Bank 
lien could attach a second time it must find title, or an 
interest of some kind, to land in Spaulding. Title, inclu-
ding all right3 title3 interest, and claim, went from Spauld-
ing to Clawson in the sale which was unredeemed. The majority 
opinion proposes to supply the vacuum of title existing in 
that circumstance by putting title in McArthur, character-
izing Clawson1s title as defunct by reason of the sale at which 
McArthur purchased, and then re-conveying from McArthur to 
Spaulding by the latter1s redemption. 
The well-established law of this state is that Clawson's 
title was not in any sense defunct (Local Realty vs. Lindquist) 
and that it persisted because before the redemption period 
expired a valid redemption had occurred (Layton vs. Layton3 
105 Utah l3 140 P2d 759 (1943) per Justice Ellett, District 
Judge, for a unanimous Court). 
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Clawson was the holder of all right, title, interest, 
and claim that Spaulding had ever had when that redemption 
took place. 
Spaulding1s redemption was not and could not be character-
ized as a re-sale or a re-purchase (Local Realty vs. Lindquist, 
85 P2d at 772). 
Clawson, not Spaulding, was entitled to possession. 
When the redemption took place, it was lawful because the 
statute says it was [69(f)(1) URCP]. The sale was voided and 
cancelled upon payment of the "certain sum of money'1 (Layton 
vs. Layton, 140 P2d 759). 
Therefore, the circuit of title postulated by the majority, 
i.e: Spaulding to Clawson to McArthur to Spaulding to Moesser 
was never completed. The evolution of title stopped at Claw-
son who was the owner of the legal and the equitable title and 
entitled to possession at the moment of valid redemption. 
We respectfully conclude that the majority opinion esta-
blishes an untenable and what in the future will be an exceed-
ingly troublesome precedent. 
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS 
We concur with the observations of Mr. Justice Crockett 
in his dissenting opinion that it would not be inconsistent with 
equity and justice that the Court recognize the superiority of 
the claim of the Plaintiffs Clawson but that they should be 
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required to make reimbursement for the paying off and the 
removal of the Walker Bank mortgage lien by Spaulding which 
became the burden of Moesser at a sale which could only be 
characterized as void. 
Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs, as Mr. Justice Crockett 
observed, acknowledged their own claim to be inferior to the 
bank trust deed which expired by reason of its foreclosure 
sale, the Plaintiffs represent that they are willing to make 
reimbursement for the paying off and removal of the Walker 
Bank lien if the Court believes, in equity and good conscience, 
they should do so as a condition to a reversal of the holding 
in the majority opinion. 
Respectfully submitted 
Ken Chamberlain 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
76 South Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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